Evidence for the association of ‘soluble’ enzymes in vivo is extensive and compelling. These associations occur in all compartments of the cell of both prokaryotes and eukaryotes. Several factors present in vivo promote these associations among enzymes whose association in vitro is often too weak to detect. Several physiological advantages of the associated enzyme complexes can be identified, most (but not all) of which are the consequence of microcompartmentation of metabolites (substrate channeling). Substrate channeling of intermediates by either a ‘direct (...) transfer’ process or ‘proximity effects’ can occur. The latter mechanism does not require the special molecular features needed for the direct transfer mechanism and may, therefore, exist in more general situations in the cell. Criticisms of these views are discussed. We argue that these criticisms have been largely answered by experiment and theory in recent years. Studies on simple systems in vitro, nevertheless, contribute important insights concerning the more complex phenomena in vivo. (shrink)

Systemic autoimmune diseases are characterized by the production of antibodies against a broad range of self-antigens. Recent evidence indicates that the majority of these autoantigens are modified in various ways during cell death. This has led to the hypothesis that the primary immune response in the development of autoimmunity is directed to components of the dying cell. In this article, we summarize data on the modification of autoantigens during cell death and the possible consequences of this for autoimmunity. BioEssays 22:627–636, (...) 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Jacques Ellul’s work on propaganda provides the basis for this analysis of life in technology. Advertising and the mass media rely on temptation and seduction and create a constant flow of propaganda, all of which serve the technological system. Propaganda aims to condition and regulate us so that we participate in and adapt ourselves to a desired pattern, specifically an existence adjusted to and in accord with the technological milieu. Technology tempts and seduces us with its promise and provision of (...) comfort, convenience, and efficiency. Above all, technology tempts and seduces us with power: power over nature and over human beings. Naively and paradoxically, we believe we have power over technology, even though it actually has power over us. Our immersion in a sea of temptation and seduction, of constant and total propaganda, may seem inescapable; however, to criticize and challenge the primacy of technology is to reassert our freedom. (shrink)

When the first volume of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri was published in 1898, all lovers of Sappho must have been disappointed with the latter half of Blass's otherwise excellent restoration of this poem. The perusal of a recent article by J. Sitzler, in which later suggestions are discussed and fresh ones made, only serves to confirm this feeling of dissatisfaction. Sappho's extant work elsewhere combines a dignified simplicity of matter with a dignified simplicity of form. Any obscurity we find in it, (...) is due rather to our ignorance of her dialect than to any real strangeness of thought or diction. By simple ideas, simple constructions, simple words, she produces a beauty all her own. It must be confessed that the latter half of the Ode to the Nereids, as it stands in any of the published restorations falls short of all else of Sappho's that we possess. It is just possible that in line II xs22EFτοισι can stand as a feminine, but, grammar apart, nothing, surely, could be tamer than the sentence as it stands with the long relative clause beginning in line 13—‘When he heard the reproach, which used to cut him to the quick and restrain him amid the mirth of his fellow citizens, and which died away for a time only to be revived soon after.’ I hope to bring the poem a stage nearer satisfactory restoration by showing that there are grounds for rejecting some at least of the suggestions which contribute to this result. (shrink)

When the first volume of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri was published in 1898, all lovers of Sappho must have been disappointed with the latter half of Blass's otherwise excellent restoration of this poem. The perusal of a recent article by J. Sitzler, in which later suggestions are discussed and fresh ones made, only serves to confirm this feeling of dissatisfaction. Sappho's extant work elsewhere combines a dignified simplicity of matter with a dignified simplicity of form. Any obscurity we find in it, (...) is due rather to our ignorance of her dialect than to any real strangeness of thought or diction. By simple ideas, simple constructions, simple words, she produces a beauty all her own. It must be confessed that the latter half of the Ode to the Nereids, as it stands in any of the published restorations falls short of all else of Sappho's that we possess. It is just possible that in line II ⋯τοισι can stand as a feminine, but, grammar apart, nothing, surely, could be tamer than the sentence as it stands with the long relative clause beginning in line 13—‘When he heard the reproach, which used to cut him to the quick and restrain him amid the mirth of his fellow citizens, and which died away for a time only to be revived soon after.’ I hope to bring the poem a stage nearer satisfactory restoration by showing that there are grounds for rejecting some at least of the suggestions which contribute to this result. (shrink)

El presente trabajo resume y comenta algunas de las aportaciones que nos han parecido más relevantes realizadas en los últimos años en torno a la obra filosófica de J. Ortega y Gasset. Desde la aparición del libro de P. Cerezo Galán La voluntad de aventura en 1983, el interés por el problema de Ortega ha experimentado un auge muy significativo y creciente en España, del que son muestra los estudios de Javier San Martín, Mª Carmen Paredes, Fco J. Martín, Máximo (...) Martín Serrano y Jaime de Salas. Nuestro trabajo, tras una exposición resumida de estas interpretaciones, intenta una síntesis conciliadora que creemos sugerida por los propios textos del filósofo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 133-134 [Access article in PDF] Fictional Beings J. M. Coetzee What Does It Mean, "To Understand"? A tennis coach is teaching a young player a forehand topspin drive. He does so with a mixture of demonstrations (nonverbal) and explanations (verbal), such as, "At the moment of impact you roll the wrist over like this" (demonstrates). The player tries the stroke again and again, (...) and each time the coach shakes his head and says, "You haven't got it yet." Then the player gets the stroke right. The coach says "Now you've got it! Now you understand! Now let's do it again!"Is this a legitimate use of the word understand? I think it is. The coach intends the following: At first you may have understood my words but from your actions—the practice strokes you played—I could not see that you had understood my meaning. Then, when you got the stroke right, and could repeat it, I saw that you had finally understood the meaning behind my words.Understanding is in this case the effective translation of words, or words plus demonstrations, into actions, where effectiveness can be easily measured. The translation is from a verbal, or mixed verbal, system into an entirely nonverbal system of electrochemical impulses.Conversely, one can picture an exhaustive analysis of forehand topspin drives by André Agassi, conducted by microphotography, implanted sensors, and so on, to issue in a mixed verbal and diagrammatic account of how Agassi plays the stroke. In this case the physiologic system of the stroke has been successfully translated into a (partially) verbal system. Again, it would be meaningful to say that the sports physiologist who does the analysis has come to understand how the stroke is played.Although in both these cases understanding is conceived of as a translation process, I concentrate from here onward on the translation process from the verbal to the nonverbal, exemplified by understanding how to play a particular stroke.The coach says X and the player tries to "do" X, but fails and fails, until finally he succeeds. When the player has at last "done" X, he has understood. Thereafter, by steps, the player ceases to depend on the coach and the coach's X: the player can do X by himself; he understands X in the sense that whenever he says X to himself he can do X. He has made X his own.I read The Sound and the Fury, the part devoted to Benjy. Benjy says X and I don't understand. I understand the words on the page one by one, many of the sentences I understand one by one in the sense that I can translate them into other English sentences, but I don't understand the logic that gets Benjy from one sentence to the next, I don't understand the references of many words that are usually referential, and sometimes I am baffled by the syntax.For whatever reason, I go on reading Benjy. In a few respects I begin to understand better. For instance, there are sentences that stop in midstride, and I begin to suspect that such sentences stop because Benjy does not want to think what [End Page 133] comes next—that is to say, that the Faulkner behind Benjy means me to understand that Benjy lacks the wherewithal to face what would naturally come next. Mainly, however, I remain in the dark.Then I begin to experience something interesting. I find that I am, in my mind, going through some of the movements of Benjy's language. I am, as it were, practicing the characteristic strokes of his game. Although I remain, for the most part, unable to translate his pages into connected discourse—that is, into a discourse in which the logical connection between one sentence and the next is, however faulty, at least clear—I am better and better able to "do" Benjy."Doing" Benjy in this case means more than parrot-like repetition of Benjy's words. I can now speak of "entering Benjy" in a way that makes sense. I... (shrink)

Joshua Anderson argues that Amartya Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā is not accurate and so it cannot serve as an example of Sen’s comprehensive consequentialism. This article presents Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā and Anderson’s criticisms of Sen’s readings. It discusses three types of readers: history readers, activist readers, and interventionist readers. It gives an interventionist reading of the Bhagavadgītā, supplementing Arjuna’s reasons and contesting those of Kṛṣṇa. It shows that Arjuna’s reasons are cogent and it respectfully argues that Kṛṣṇa’s (...) arguments are incomplete and unconvincing. Even if Arjuna’s reasons are not ultimately decisive, they legitimately feature in his deliberations. It responds to Anderson, urging that Sen correctly advocates comprehensive consequentialism and agent-relativity, rather than cumulative outcomes and agent-neutrality, and that Sen correctly sees these contrasts exemplified in the Bhagavadgītā. It concludes with a discussion of the impartial spectator, kin,.. (shrink)

A revised edition of this translation which was first published in 1934. Silber has added a vigorous and provocative essay focusing attention on the importance of the Religion for understanding Kant's ethics.--J. M. W.

An authorized, eminently readable translation of a work first published in German in 1957. Martin leads his reader into the problems of metaphysics by tracing the development of Plato's thought and Aristotle's criticism of Plato, focusing throughout on the question, "What is unity?" Although the book is introductory in intent and tone, it offers its own interpretation of Plato and Aristotle.--J. M. W.

Drawing upon recent contributions to an already developed literature of diverse speculation on Bayle and his milieu, the author attempts to assess the historical significance of Bayle's writings by means of a chronological treatment of the French Calvinist's changing understanding of the relation of faith and reason. One may find here the main lines of Bayle criticism judiciously set forth, together with a careful investigation of some biographical material and the exposition of Bayle's principal ideas on the role and limits (...) of reason as a speculative and moral guide, the function of grace, the grounds of faith and morality, the problem of error, and, the centrality of Providence. The author argues convincingly for the thesis that Bayle remained consistently loyal to the traditions of the Reform. On the other hand, the closely related attempt to illuminate the logic of Bayle's ambiguous statements of the dualism of reason, as an instrument for yielding clarity and evidence, and as the agent of man's struggle with the unknowable, lacks critical vigor. Nonetheless, this work is a very readable summary of the intellectual contribution of a crucial figure in the evolution of French philosophical and religious thought. A valuable bibliography is included.--J. M. S. (shrink)

F. H. George is Professor of Cybernetics at Brunel University in England. His book comprises eight chapters originally developed as lectures for a non-specialist audience. He points out the position of computer science among the sciences, explains its aims, procedures, and achievements to date, and speculates on its long-term implications for science in particular and society in general. Among the topics discussed are biological simulation and organ replacement, automated education, and the new philosophy of science. Each chapter concludes with a (...) brief summary. George's treatment of the technical details of his speciality is both illuminating and readable, thus serving as an excellent primer on one of the new technology's most important components. His wider forays into philosophy, economics, sociology, and religion are less happy, however; and unfortunately they take up a large part of the text. In general, they reveal that George identifies the methods of human advancement with the methods of the natural sciences in an equation whose rigidity would make even B. F. Skinner blush. Yet, the reader cannot claim that he was not forewarned; for in the introduction, D. J. Stewart, Chairman of the Rationalist Press Association, suggests that the current "swing of interest among young people away from the physical and biological sciences and towards the behavioural and social sciences... represents a symptom of disillusionment with science and technology and an attempted escape into irrationality."--J. M. V. (shrink)

Dicke discusses the metamorphosis of Hegelianism in Feuerbach and Marx through an examination of the concept of identity in the three philosophers. He demonstrates the persistence of this concept as a decisive theme in both Feuerbach and Marx, and shows how Hegel's doctrine of identity is transformed and adulterated in the process of adaptation. A primary consequence of Marx's modification of this doctrine is the philosophical sacrifice of the individual to the collective, which has its practical consequences in contemporary communist (...) states.--J. M. W. (shrink)

The author wants to explicate a core "philosophy of human finitude" in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and many others, philosophical and literary. A great many themes are taken up, and interesting connections among those writers are suggested. Some important distinctions are lost, however, and the wide-ranging topics are not fully developed.--J. M.

Essays on Gilbert, Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, Harvey, van Helmont, and Descartes attempt, at a medium level of complexity, to relate the positions of these men to twentieth century views of the same questions. The stated purpose of the book is the assessment of the role of each man in the "methodological revolution"; although the methods are discussed, little attempt is made to put them into the context necessary for the reader to view them as revolutionary.—J. M. B.

A richly detailed history of French secular thought in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A wealth of material is introduced from unpublished manuscripts. Spink's stress on the clandestine spread of the enlightenment, in spite of official suppression, is interesting and sobering.--J. M. W.

Hartmann gives a careful, succinct, clear exposition, and, integral to it, a criticism of the main systematic outlines of Sartre's L'être et le néant. He interprets Sartre as attempting to use a phenomenological base for an "objective" ontology. He suggests that Sartre's highly formal dialectic, unlike its Hegelian model, is external to its "content" of concrete existential insights. The comparisons of the en-soi and pour-soi with Hegel's Sein, Dasein, Fürsichsein, and the more developed Begriff and Geist go far to challenge (...) the adequacy and richness of Sartre's determinations. The author discusses Husserl's subject-oriented epistemology, and refers to the Heideggerian contributions to Sartre's phenomenological base. A first rate job of opening up serious questioning in the area.--J. M. (shrink)